As described in the case study, Toemik and Siiquent service different markets. In terms of the razor blade model (page 2) Isolde’s company sells the razor blades, which are priced-up. She describes this as selling “the stuff the machines use.” Isolde’s business model is one of using competitive pricing and selling on a units model, not a service model. This alligns with her market as Siiquent has posed itself as a seller of necessary tools for the diagnoses made on DNA sequencing; the company does not claim to equip facilities with the larger machines needed for such diagnoses. Emmanuel’s company sells the shavers themselves—really the machines used in DNA sequence research—which are sold at price. Teomik’s model positions itself as the Gods that can provide precise equipment needed by hospitals, which render for them fat markets from hospitals and prestigious research institutions. This makes sense being that the “razor blades”—the smaller-scale movable parts necessary to utilize the shavers provided by Emmanuel’s company are not their concern.
The single revenue model is appealing to me (as a star PM, of course). I am more comfortable with a unified vision, one which all components of a company adhere to and hopefully tweak for the sake of optimization. A unified model neatly compartmentalizes the vision of Teomik-Siiquent’s company as well, pleasing stakeholders and concerned parties. A multi-faceted, flexible model is also appealing to me. Adaptability should be a concern of healthy, innovative companies, and wedging a company into a single strategic niche could hinder this. If frequent adjustments are made to such a model, to complete the necessary task of staying on top of competitors, persuading customers, and driving the market, a lot can be said for the agility of a company that employs such a model.
Mergers seem to be messy, and an intermediary between Teomik and Siiquent would be necessary to facilitate a smooth fusion of the companies. I would first make sure that both leaders, Isolde and Emmanuel, accurately grasp the services their companies provide and which services should remain discreet in the merged companies. Consolidation and fat-trimming will be key—what stays, what blends, what gets chopped. If both companies are on equal footing to Scherr, to which the case study alludes, then there should be no clear “winner” in this merger. If this is not the case, however, weakpoints in the more fledgling enterprise should be pointed out and Scherr should devise strategies to rectify them. This set of steps should be a good starting spot for discussions regarding such a merger.
